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I. INTRODUCTION 
Every child is familiar of the story about the frog that fell into a 
vat of milk and avoided drowning by swimming in the milk long 
enough to turn the milk into butter. As far as international law is 
concerned, the enterprise of Israeli settlements in the occupied 
Palestinian territories is a frog swimming in a milk vat. The 
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) has observed that the 
establishment of settlements violates article 49 of the Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War (“Fourth Geneva Convention”), which provides that “[t]he 
Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian 
population into the territory it occupies.”1 The Court reasoned that 
the prohibition contained in article 49 encompasses “not only 
deportations or forced transfers of population . . . but also any 
measures taken by an occupying Power in order to organize or 
encourage transfers of parts of its own population into the occupied 
territory.”2 This interpretation of article 49 represents near-consensus 
in the international community.3 The U.N. Security Council has thus 
described “Israel’s policy and practices of settling parts of its 
population . . . in [the occupied Arab] territories” as a “flagrant 
violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention.”4 
Customary international law generally requires a State that 
violated international law to re-establish the situation that existed 
 
 1.  Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time 
of War art. 49, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention]; 
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 183 (July 9) [hereinafter Wall 
Advisory Opinion]. 
 2.  Id.  
 3.  See, e.g., EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 
240 (2d ed. 2012); Orna Ben-Naftali, Aeyal M. Gross & Keren Michaeli, Illegal 
Occupation: Framing the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L 
L. 551, 581 (2005); Implementation of the Fourth Geneva Convention in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories: History of a Multilateral Process (1997-2001), 
INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/ 
documents/misc/5fldpj.htm (last updated Nov. 29, 2010). 
 4.  S.C. Res. 465, para. 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/465 (Mar. 1, 1980). 
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before the violation.5 Moreover, Israeli officials acting to facilitate 
the settlement of Israeli nationals within the occupied Arab territories 
may incur individual criminal responsibility under article 
8(2)(b)(viii) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(“Rome Statute”), which proscribes “the transfer, directly or 
indirectly, by the occupying Power of parts of its own civilian 
population into the territory it occupies” as a war crime.6 
The legal recipe for turning milk into butter is found in the 
principle of ex factis ius oritur (the law arises from the facts), which 
recognizes the “normative pressure of facts.”7 One expression of this 
principle in international law concerns the manner in which 
violations of customary international law bear on the content of the 
law. It has been observed that “[s]ince customary international law 
often changes by means of violation of its norms[,]” ex factis ius 
oritur “has more relevance in international law than in domestic 
law.”8 Yet, the purview of ex factis ius oritur extends beyond 
changes in the law emanating from its violation. This principle also 
holds that “long-standing situations, even if illegal from the outset, 
crystallize over time to become legal situations.”9 This article 
focuses on the latter expression of ex factis ius oritur. 
The inquiry concerning the manifestations of ex factis ius oritur 
regarding the plea of illegally implanted settlers against repatriation 
is two-fold. First, the interests of settlers in non-repatriation may be 
protected under a norm of international human rights law prohibiting 
 
 5.  JAMES CRAWFORD, STATE RESPONSIBILITY: THE GENERAL PART 510-11 
(2013) [hereinafter CRAWFORD, STATE RESPONSIBILITY]; see infra note 47 and 
accompanying text. 
 6.  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(b)(viii), July 17, 
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S 3 [hereinafter Rome Statute]; see Michael Cottier, Article 8, in 
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
275, 369 (Otto Triffterer, 2d ed. 2008) (“Certainly, state agents, including 
government officials and parliamentarians, incur criminal responsibility under 
article 8[(2)(b)(viii)] for conducting, ordering, soliciting or inducing a transfer”). 
 7.  This expression appears in Rein Müllerson, The Continuity and Succession 
of States, by Reference to the Former USSR and Yugoslavia, 42 INT’L & COMP. L. 
Q. 473, 487 (1993). 
 8.  Rein Müllerson, The ABM Treaty: Changed Circumstances, Extraordinary 
Events, Supreme Interests and International Law, 50 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 509, 525 
(2001). 
 9.  Ruta M. Kalvaitis, Note, Citizenship and National Identity in the Baltic 
States, 16 B.U. INT’L L.J. 231, 243 (1998). 
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any State—both the occupier and the legitimate sovereign after it 
regains effective control over the territory—from repatriating 
settlers.10 There are two conditions for such a prohibition. There must 
be a norm of international human rights law that brings the interests 
of settlers adversely affected by repatriation within the realm of a 
protected human right.11 Because the vast majority of protected 
human rights are not absolute, a prohibition on the repatriation of 
settlers must also be justified on the basis of a strict balancing of 
interests analysis, which weighs the interests of the settlers against 
those of both the local population and of the legitimate sovereign.12 
Therefore, the protection against repatriation granted to illegally 
implanted settlers under international human rights law varies from 
one settler group to another, depending on the international human 
rights instruments that govern each situation and on the factual 
circumstances affecting the balancing of interests.13 
Second, ex factis ius oritur may be manifested in the rules of 
customary international law concerning the responsibility of states 
for internationally wrongful acts (“State Responsibility Rules”), 
which determine the legal consequences of state conduct that violates 
international law.14 International law recognizes the fundamental 
distinction “between primary norms that define rights and obligations 
and secondary norms that define the consequences of the breach of 
primary norms.”15 State Responsibility Rules refer to “the body of 
secondary norms that sets out to explore the consequences of 
breaching primary norms.”16 The legal obligations of an occupant 
resulting from violating the prohibition on settlement activity are 
thus determined by State Responsibility Rules. State Responsibility 
 
 10.  YAËL RONEN, TRANSITION FROM ILLEGAL REGIMES UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 190 (2011) [hereinafter RONEN, TRANSITION FROM ILLEGAL 
REGIMES] (“[T]he factual presence of settlers may generate legal consequences, 
embodied in international human rights law, that limit the post-transition regime’s 
right to expel them despite the illegality of their arrival in the territory.”). 
 11.  Id. at 190-205; infra notes 87-90, 99-134 and accompanying text. 
 12.  See infra notes 91-98, 135-148 and accompanying text.  
 13.  See discussion infra Section III.  
 14.  See generally U.N. Int’l L. Comm’n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries (2001), available at 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf 
[hereinafter Draft Articles].  
 15.  BENVENISTI, supra note 3, at 307.  
 16.  Id. at 308. 
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Rules generally require a State acting contrary to international law to 
eliminate the consequences of the violation.17 However, the Rules 
recognize exceptions to this obligation resulting from “the realization 
that the breach of the primary norm may have created new 
circumstances which render impossible, unjust, or undesirable the 
reversion to the previous state of affairs.”18 
International human rights law does not currently prohibit the 
repatriation of Israeli settlers.19 However, this article’s main 
proposition turns on the relationship between ex factis ius oritur and 
State Responsibility Rules. This article argues that the interests of 
individual settlers may attain sufficient legal significance to support 
an exemption for an occupant from its duty under State 
Responsibility Rules to eliminate the consequences of its illegal 
settlement activity (i.e., the duty to repatriate the settlers) before the 
consolidation of a human rights law prohibition against repatriation. 
This article argues that such an exemption has emerged, or is in the 
process of emerging, with respect to illegally implanted Israeli 
settlers. 
Section II reviews the legal regime set forth by State 
Responsibility Rules concerning the general obligation of States to 
eliminate the consequences of their violation of international law and 
the exceptions to this obligation. It also reviews the European Court 
of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) decision in Demopoulos v. Turkey,20 
which exemplifies the manner in which one of these exceptions 
protects the claims of individuals who would be adversely affected 
by the re-establishment of the situation preceding the violation of 
international law. 
Section III argues that no provision of an international human 
rights convention brings the non-repatriation plea of Israeli settlers 
within the realm of a protected human right. Even if it were possible 
to point to such a provision, the repatriation of Israeli settlers would 
 
 17.  CRAWFORD, STATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 5, at 510 (clarifying that 
this does not involve the “re-establishment of the situation that would have existed 
had the wrongful act not been committed” but rather the situation that “existed 
before the wrongful act was committed”); see also infra note 47 and accompanying 
text.  
 18.  BENVENISTI, supra note 3, at 308.  
 19.  See discussion infra Section III.  
 20.  2010-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 365. 
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probably be permitted under the balancing of interest regime that 
generally prevails in international human rights law. This section 
therefore concludes that international human rights law does not 
prohibit the repatriation of Israeli settlers. 
Section IV shows that examining whether or not international 
human rights law prohibits the repatriation of illegally implanted 
settlers is fundamentally different from examining whether or not 
State Responsibility Rules exempt the occupant from carrying out 
repatriation. Exemption under the latter does not depend on a 
prohibition under the former. Inquiring whether the interests of 
individual settlers have attained sufficient legal significance to 
support an exemption for an occupant from its obligation to eliminate 
the consequences of its illegal settlement enterprise does not entail 
the type of robust balancing of interest analysis that prevails in 
international human rights law. Rather, State Responsibility Rules 
recognize an exemption whenever imposing such an obligation 
would result in the “forcible eviction and rehousing of potentially 
large numbers of men, women and children.”21 
Section V argues that a good faith assessment is immaterial in 
determining the extent of protection provided to illegally implanted 
settlers under international law. Section VI maintains that the 
absence of the occupant’s duty to repatriate the settlers allows for a 
strong argument in favor of including the interest in non-repatriation 
within the sphere of interests that an occupant may legitimately 
promote in negotiating the end of occupation. 
The scope of the present inquiry is limited. Some commentators 
argue that actions on behalf of an occupant aimed at perpetuating the 
occupation, such as the settlement of the occupant’s own citizens in 
the occupied territory, may render the entire occupation regime 
illegal under international law, even if the occupation initially 
resulted from the lawful use of force by the occupant in self-
defense.22 Other international lawyers disagree, maintaining that the 
notion of illegal occupation in international law does not extend to 
occupation resulting from the lawful use of force by a State in self-
 
 21.  Demopoulos, 2010-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 411.  
 22.  Ben-Naftali, Gross & Michaeli, supra note 3, at 551-56 (advancing this 
argument in relation to Israel’s occupation of Arab territories since 1967, which is 
currently the only prolonged occupation resulting from a war of self-defense).   
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defense.23 Elsewhere, this author subscribed to the latter view.24 
Nonetheless, the debate on whether the illegality of occupation under 
international law may extend to occupation resulting from a lawful 
war of self-defense is beyond the scope of the present article. 
Moreover, an Israeli insistence that the settlements continue to 
exist may present an insurmountable obstacle to any peace 
negotiation aimed at reaching a political solution to end the 
occupation. The present article does not consider whether such 
insistence on the part of Israel is advisable, nor does it explore any 
duties that Israel may have toward the Palestinian population 
transcending the law of occupation, which may emerge as a result of 
further prolonging the occupation. 
II. EXEMPTIONS FROM THE OBLIGATION TO 
ELIMINATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF A 
VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
A. THE OBLIGATION TO MAKE RESTITUTION AND THE ECTHR 
JUDGMENT IN DEMOPOULOS V. TURKEY 
In 1974, as tensions between the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-
Cypriot communities in Cyprus culminated, the Turkish military 
 
 23.  See YORAM DINSTEIN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF BELLIGERENT 
OCCUPATION 2 (2009) [hereinafter DINSTEIN, BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION] (“A . . . 
myth surrounding the legal regime of belligerent occupation is that it is, or 
becomes in time, inherently illegal under international law.”); Yoram Dinstein, The 
International Legal Dimensions of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, in ISRAEL AMONG 
THE NATIONS 137, 150 (Alfred E. Kellerman et al. eds., 1998) (“While belligerent 
occupation does not transfer title (sovereignty), it does mean that the occupying 
Power has a temporary right of possession (which can continue as long as peace is 
not concluded).”); Michael Curtis, International Law and the Territories, 32 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 457, 464-65 (1991) (“Israel is legally entitled to remain in the 
territory it now holds and to protect its security interests therein until new 
boundaries are drawn in a peace settlement.”); Rosalyn Higgins, The Place of 
International Law in the Settlement of Disputes by the Security Council, 64 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 1, 8 (1970) (“[T]here is nothing in either the [U.N.] Charter or general 
international law which leads one to suppose that military occupation, pending a 
peace treaty, is illegal.”). 
 24.  Ariel Zemach, Can Occupation Resulting from a War of Self-Defense 
Become Illegal?, 24 MINN. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 1) 
(arguing “that the purview of the notion of illegal occupation in international law 
does not extend to occupation resulting from the lawful use of force by a state in 
self-defense”).  
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invaded Northern Cyprus, claiming to act in defense of the Turkish-
Cypriot community.25 The Turkish invasion resulted in Turkey 
occupying Northern Cyprus.26 Hostilities surrounding the Turkish 
invasion resulted in massive dislocation of populations. 
Approximately 162,000 Greek-Cypriots fled from Northern Cyprus 
and the Turkish occupying forces subsequently prevented them from 
returning to their homes.27 In addition, some 48,000 Turkish-Cypriots 
residing in Southern Cyprus left their homes and fled to the north, 
where they settled in the homes of Greek-Cypriots.28 
In 1983, the Turkish-Cypriot community proclaimed a separate 
State, the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (“TRNC”), in the 
territory occupied by Turkey.29 The proclamation of the TRNC was 
widely condemned by the international community.30 No State except 
Turkey recognized the TRNC as a State, and Northern Cyprus 
remained a territory under Turkish occupation in the eyes of the 
international community.31 In 1985, the TRNC enacted the TRNC 
Constitution.32 One of the provisions of this instrument provided for 
the expropriation of the properties owned by dislocated Greek-
Cypriots on the ground that they had been abandoned in 1974.33 
The consolidation of Turkish occupation in Northern Cyprus was 
followed by large waves of Turkish settlers who migrated from 
Turkey to Northern Cyprus with the encouragement of the Turkish 
government and of the TRNC.34 Many of the Turkish settlers became 
occupants of expropriated Greek-Cypriot property.35 
 
 25.  Rhodri C. Williams, Introductory Note to the European Court of Human 
Rights: Demopoulos v. Turkey, 49 I.L.M 816, 816 (2010).  
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Cyprus: Prospects Remain Dim of Political Resolution to Change 
Situation of IDPs, INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT MONITORING CTR. 4 (June 30, 2009), 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4a4a1ff92.html.  
 28.  Id. at 4-5.  
 29.  Williams, supra note 25, at 816.  
 30.  Loizidou v. Turkey, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2216 (describing the response 
of the international community to the proclamation of the TRNC).   
 31.  Williams, supra note 25, at 816.  
 32.  Constitution, LEXAS, http://www.lexas.net/worldfactbook/data/ 
government/constitution.asp (last updated Dec. 25, 2010).  
 33.  Id. at art. 159(1)(b); Loizidou, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 519-20.  
 34.  RONEN, TRANSITION FROM ILLEGAL REGIMES, supra note 10, at 232.  
 35.  Andrew Sanger, Property Rights in an Occupied Territory, 70 CAMBRIDGE 
L. J. 7, 8 (2011) (noting the tension “between the property rights of displaced 
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Greek-Cypriot refugees brought claims against Turkey before the 
ECtHR, which resulted in judgments stating that Turkey violated 
article 1 of the First Protocol to the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“First 
Protocol”) by preventing the refugees from returning to their 
properties.36 Article 1 provides that “[e]very natural or legal person is 
entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions.”37 Moreover, 
the Court concluded that preventing the Greek-Cypriot refugees from 
returning to their homes violated article 8 of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (“ECHR”), which states that “everyone has the right to 
respect for  . . . his home.”38 However, the most recent judgment on 
this matter, Demopoulos v. Turkey, demonstrates how the ex factis 
ius oritur principle erodes the general obligation of States acting 
contrary to international law to eliminate the consequences of the 
violation. 
The applicants in Demopoulos, Greek-Cypriot refugees, claimed 
that the Turkish military deprived them of enjoying their possessions 
in Northern Cyprus, contrary to article 1 of the First Protocol.39 
Turkey, the respondent, argued that the applicants failed to meet a 
threshold condition for the admissibility of their application that 
requires the applicants to exhaust domestic remedies before applying 
to the Court.40 In particular, Turkey pointed to how the applicants 
 
Greek Cypriots and the rights of individuals now living in their homes or using 
their land (some are Turkish-Cypriot refugees from the South of Cyprus, but many 
are Turkish settlers)”). 
 36.  Alexandrou v. Turkey, App. No. 16162/90, paras. 6-10 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 
28, 2009), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx? 
i=001-93694; Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey, App. No. 46347/99, para. 23 (Eur. Ct. 
H.R. Dec. 22, 2005), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/fra/pages/ 
search.aspx?i=001-71800; Demades v. Turkey, App. No. 16219/90, para. 12 (Eur. 
Ct. H.R. July 31, 2003), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/ 
search.aspx?i=001-61272; Loizidou, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 522. 
 37.  Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms art. 1, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262. 
 38.  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR]; Xenides-
Arestis, App. No. 46347/99, para. 16.   
 39.  Demopoulos, 2010-I Eur. Ct. H.R.at 377-78.  
 40.  ECHR, supra note 38, art. 35 (“The Court may only deal with the matter 
after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally 
recognized rules of international law, and within a period of six months from the 
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failed to bring their claims before the Immovable Property 
Commission (“IPC”), a domestic TRNC body established to resolve 
claims to property that had been expropriated under the TRNC 
constitution.41 The Court accepted the Turkish argument.42 
The applicants reasoned that requiring them to bring their claims 
before TRNC authorities lent legitimacy to an illegal regime.43 
However, considering the IPC to be essentially a Turkish entity, the 
Court determined that the authority of the IPC must be recognized, 
reasoning that “the key consideration is to avoid a vacuum which 
operates to the detriment of those who live under the occupation, or 
those who, living outside, may claim to have been victims of 
infringements of their rights.”44 The Court then proceeded to 
conclude that the IPC constituted “an accessible and effective 
framework of redress in respect of complaints about interference 
with the property owned by Greek Cypriots.”45 Therefore, the Court 
concluded that the applications were inadmissible because the 
applicants failed to exhaust domestic remedies.46 
Although the Court formally determined the case on procedural 
grounds, its decision has far-reaching consequences for substantive 
international law, particularly in balancing the principle of ex factis 
ius oritur against its rival ex injuria ius non oritur, which holds that 
violating the law cannot have legal effect.47 The legal regime that 
governs this balancing is contained in State Responsibility Rules, 
which set forth the obligation of restitution and its exceptions.48 The 
International Law Commission (“ILC”) codified State Responsibility 
Rules in its Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts (“Draft Articles”).49 Article 35 of the 
Draft Articles states that “[a] State responsible for an internationally 
wrongful act is under an obligation to make restitution, that is, to re-
 
date on which the final decision was taken.”). 
 41.  Demopoulos, 2010-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 389-91.  
 42.  Id. at 415.  
 43.  Id. at 404.  
 44.  Id. at 405. 
 45.  Id. at 415.  
 46.  Id. 
 47.  ADOLF SPRUDZS, “EX INIURIA IUS NON ORITUR” AND THE BALTIC CASE: A 
BRIEF WESTERN PERSPECTIVE 1-2, 4 (1998).   
 48.  Draft Articles, supra note 14.  
 49.  Id.  
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establish the situation which existed before the wrongful act was 
committed.”50 Article 35, however, recognizes two exceptions to the 
obligation of restitution. First, restitution is not required if it is 
“materially impossible” (the “material impossibility exception”).51 
Second, restitution is not required if it involves “a burden out of all 
proportion to the benefit deriving from restitution instead of 
compensation” (the “disproportionate burden exception”).52 
Examining whether recourse to the IPC was required for the 
applicants to satisfy the exhaustion of domestic remedies 
requirement, the ECtHR inquired whether the remedies available to 
the applicants through IPC proceedings were adequate.53 The 
applicants argued that the record of IPC proceedings suggests that 
only a small proportion of the property of Greek-Cypriot refugees 
was in practice eligible for restitution under the IPC mechanism.54 
Dismissing this argument, the Court replied that it “does not consider 
that this, to the extent that it can be considered as an accurate 
assertion, undermines the effectiveness of the new [IPC] scheme.”55 
This position relies on an interpretation of State Responsibility 
Rules that recognizes an extremely broad material impossibility 
exception to the obligation to make restitution. The Court rejected 
the claim that the scope of the material impossibility exception is 
restricted to physical impossibility due to the permanent loss or 
destruction of the property.56 The Court viewed that the passage of 
time imposes a price on restitution with regard to the interests of 
individuals adversely affected by it, which renders certain violations 
of international law legally irreversible as far as State Responsibility 
Rules are concerned. Commenting on the circumstances of the cases  
 
 50.  Id. at art. 35.  
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Demopoulos v. Turkey, 2010-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 365, 389.  
 54.  Id. at 412.  
 55.  Id.  
 56.  Id. at 411.  
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before it, the Court observed: 
In the present applications, some thirty-five years have elapsed since the 
applicants lost possession of their property in northern Cyprus in 1974. 
Generations have passed. The local population has not remained static . . . 
Turkish-Cypriot refugees from the south have settled in the north; Turkish 
settlers from Turkey have arrived in large numbers and established their 
homes. Much Greek-Cypriot property has changed hands at least once, 
whether by sale, donation or inheritance.57 
In view of this reality, the Court deemed “unrealistic” the 
expectation that it orders Turkey to ensure that the applicants 
repossess their properties regardless of who is currently living 
there.58 Rather, in determining the appropriate remedy for its own 
violations of international law, Turkey is entitled to take into account 
“the position of third parties.”59 The ECtHR judgment has been 
criticized for undermining the primacy of restitution as a remedy for 
violating international law and for directly contradicting “the 
elementary principle of international law ex injuria jus non oritur.”60 
The view that the material impossibility exception extends beyond 
physical impossibility to protect legitimate interests of third parties is 
hardly innovative. The ILC expressed the same view in its 
Commentary on State Responsibility Rules, which preceded 
Demopoulos and relied on an international arbitration judgment 
dating back to 1933.61 The ILC observed that “[m]aterial 
impossibility is not limited to cases where the object in question has 
been destroyed, but can cover more complex situations”62 and that 
“in certain cases, the position of third parties may have to be taken 
into account in considering whether restitution is materially 
 
 57.  Id. at 401-02 (stating that its jurisprudence “cannot, if it is to be coherent 
and meaningful, be either static or blind to concrete factual circumstances”). 
 58.  Id. at 410. 
 59.  Demopoulos v. Turkey, 2010-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 365, 411.  
 60.  Loukis G. Loucaides, Is the European Court of Human Rights Still a 
Principled Court of Human Rights After the Demopoulos Case?, 24 LEIDEN J. 
INT’L L. 435, 435-36, 456 (2011) (criticizing the Court for its “disregard of the 
right of restitutio in integrum”).  
 61.  Forests of Central Rhodopia (Greece v. Bulgaria), 3 Rep. Int’l Arb. 
Awards 1389, 1432 (1950). 
 62.  Draft Articles, supra note 14, art. 35 (commentary).  
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possible.”63 
However, the ECtHR interpretation of the material impossibility 
exception helps clarify the scope of protection afforded to 
individuals under this exception in two ways. First, the Court’s 
reasoning indicates that the question of whether or not individuals 
who benefited from a State’s violation of international law were 
aware of the violation does not bear on the protection provided to 
them under the material impossibility exception.64 Second, the 
Demopoulos judgment suggests that the inquiry into whether the 
interests of individuals justify relieving the violating State of its 
obligation to make restitution is different from the robust balancing 
of interest analysis that prevails in international human rights law.65 
Thus, the Court seems to recognize an exemption from the obligation 
to make restitution whenever imposing such obligation would result 
in the “forcible eviction and rehousing of potentially large numbers 
of men, women and children.”66 
Although the ECtHR did not use the ILC’s terminology, which 
distinguishes between the material impossibility and the 
disproportionate burden exceptions,67 the Court’s ruling relies 
exclusively on the former. The disproportionate burden exception 
applies “only where there is grave disproportionality between the 
burden which restitution would impose on the responsible State and 
the benefit which would be gained, either by the injured State or by 
any victim of the breach.”68 Setting the threshold for the exception to 
the restitution obligation at grave disproportionality, this balancing 
test grants “preference for the position of the injured State in any 
case where the balancing process does not indicate a clear preference 
for compensation as compared with restitution.”69 The Court’s 
analysis in Demopoulos seems far from the robust balancing required 
under this demanding disproportionality threshold. 
Although in Demopoulos the ECtHR recognized the status of 
 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  See infra text accompanying note 202.  
 65.  See discussion infra Section IV.  
 66.  Demopoulos v. Turkey, 2010-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 365, 411.  
 67.  See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.  
 68.  Draft Articles, supra note 14, art. 35 (commentary) (emphasis added). 
 69.  Id. 
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Northern Cyprus as an occupied territory,70 it did not apply the norms 
of international humanitarian law. Rather, Demopoulos involved the 
obligations of Turkey arising from its violation of European human 
rights law. Whereas most rights conferred upon individuals under 
human rights law lend themselves to balancing analyses, the 
obligation imposed on an occupying State under international 
humanitarian law to refrain from settling its own nationals within the 
occupied territory is an absolute one.71 Therefore, it has been argued 
that the duty of an occupant to repatriate illegally implanted settlers 
is absolute because it arises from the violation of an absolute 
prohibition.72 
This argument is, however, unpersuasive. The distinction between 
absolute and non-absolute primary norms of international law is of 
little significance in applying secondary norms of international law.73 
The absolute nature of an international humanitarian law prohibition 
does not suggest that violating this prohibition gives rise to an 
absolute obligation to make restitution. Eyal Benvenisti thus noted 
that the unique gravity of a particular violation of international law 
and the status of the violated norm as jus cogens do not diminish the 
protection that State Responsibility Rules grant to individuals who 
would be adversely affected by restitution.74 Cautioning against a 
theory that “conflates primary and secondary norms,”75 Benvenisti 
observed that: 
 
 70.  Demopoulos, 2010-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 404-05.  
 71.  Geneva Convention, supra note 1, art. 49 (recognizing no exception to the 
prohibition on the transfer of an occupant’s nationals into the occupied territory). 
 72.  See, e.g., Yael Ronen, International Law and the Rights of Settlers to 
Remain in Formerly Occupied Territory After the Transfer of Control: Settlers in 
the West Bank, Baltic States, and Northern Cyprus, 13 L. & GOV’T 49, 89 (2011) 
(Hebrew) [hereinafter Ronen, International Law]. Ronen argues that:  
In contrast with a sovereign state, which chooses whether or not to allow foreign 
nationals to reside within its territory, and which is required to do so by way of 
balancing the various rights and interests, the duty of an occupying power to refrain 
from settling its nationals within an occupied territory, as well as its duty, having 
settled such individuals [within the occupied territory] to repatriate them, are not 
subject to balancing analyses. The prohibition on the settlement of [the occupant’s 
own] nationals and the derivative duty to repatriate them are absolute. The state has no 
discretion on this matter. Id. 
 73.  BENVENISTI, supra note 3, at 312-13.  
 74.  Id. at 312.  
 75.   Id. 
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[T]here can be no logical inference from the assertion that certain norms 
are non-derogable to the conclusion that there can be no limitations on the 
consequences of unlawful derogations . . . . The concern that has always 
informed both domestic remedial norms and the international one, that it 
would be unjust to correct one wrong by creating another, also informs 
the international law relevant to the remedies of jus cogens violations.76 
B. REPATRIATING ILLEGALLY IMPLANTED SETTLERS: RESTITUTION 
OR CESSATION OF A CONTINUING VIOLATION? 
An exemption from the duty to repatriate illegally implanted 
settlers, arising from the plea of settlers adversely affected by 
repatriation, largely depends on whether repatriation is viewed as an 
exercise of the obligation to cease a continuing violation of 
international law or of the obligation to make restitution. State 
Responsibility Rules require a State to first cease its internationally 
wrongful conduct, if it is continuing, regardless of whether the 
unlawful conduct is an action or an omission.77 Unlike the obligation 
to make restitution, the obligation of cessation has no exception.78 
In the Wall Advisory Opinion, the ICJ found that Israel’s 
construction of a wall within the occupied Palestinian territory 
violated international human rights law and international 
humanitarian law.79 The Court concluded that, “cessation of those 
violations entails the dismantling forthwith of those parts of that 
structure situated within the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
including in and around East Jerusalem.”80 Can the presence in an 
occupied territory of settlers transferred to that territory in violation 
of international law be considered a continuing violation of 
international law, analogous with the presence of the Israeli Wall, 
 
 76.  Id. at 312-13. 
 77.  Draft Articles, supra note 14, art. 30. see also Olivier Corten, The 
Obligation of Cessation, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 545, 545 
(James Crawford et al. eds., 2010).  
 78.  Draft Articles, supra note 14, art. 30 (commentary); CRAWFORD, STATE 
RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 5, at 465 (observing, “restitution is subject to 
limitations that cessation is not”); Corten, supra note 77, at 548 (noting that 
exemptions from the obligation of cessation “would constitute a limitation that 
would call into question the binding force of the primary rules themselves and 
endanger the validity, certainty, and effectiveness of international legal relations. 
In law, a State must and can always put an end to a continuing breach.”). 
 79.  See Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 1, paras. 114-37.  
 80.  Id. at para. 151. 
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and give rise to the obligation of cessation? 
Notwithstanding the far-reaching consequences of the distinction 
between cessation and restitution, the ILC observed that it is difficult 
to distinguish between cessation and restitution because “the result of 
cessation may be indistinguishable from restitution.”81 The ICJ could 
have viewed Israel’s obligation to dismantle the Wall as part of the 
obligation to make restitution, which “consists in reestablishing the 
status quo ante, i.e., the situation that existed prior to the occurrence 
of the wrongful act[,]”82 but it opted to invoke the obligation of 
cessation. 
Preventing Greek-Cypriots from returning to their property in 
Northern Cyprus could also be viewed as a continuing violation of 
international law, giving rise to an absolute obligation of cessation. 
However, the ECtHR in Demopoulos clearly rejected this 
interpretation.83 The ECtHR ruling suggested that if the 
reestablishment of the status quo preceding the violation directly 
interferes with the lives of individuals, the legal consequences of the 
violation are determined by the norm governing restitution and its 
exceptions.84 The situation before the ECtHR in Demopoulos was 
different from the one considered by the ICJ in the Wall Advisory 
Opinion. Dismantling the Wall and rebuilding it within the borders 
of Israel may compromise the security of individual settlers, but such 
measure would not amount to directly interfering with their lives, as 
opposed to the forced eviction of those who currently occupy Greek-
Cypriot property that the applicants sought in Demopoulos. 
The ECtHR’s position in Demopoulos also avoids potential 
tension that may arise between State Responsibility Rules and 
international human rights law. Consider the case of settlers of 
Russian origin illegally implanted in the Baltic states by the Soviet 
 
 81.  Draft Articles, supra note 14, art. 30 (commentary) (noting “the difficulty 
of distinguishing between cessation and restitution”); CRAWFORD, STATE 
RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 5, at 512; see also Christine Gray, The Different 
Forms of Reparation: Restitution, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
589, 590 (James Crawford et al. eds., 2010) (“The results of restitution and 
cessation, both legal consequences of a wrongful act, are not always distinct.”). 
 82.  Draft Articles, supra note 14, art. 35 (commentary). 
 83.  See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text. 
 84.  Id. 
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occupant.85 The bulk of authority favors the view that at least some 
of these settlers are protected from expulsion under the ECHR.86 If 
State Responsibility Rules had required the Soviet occupant to 
repatriate these settlers to fulfill the absolute obligation of cessation, 
the duty of the Soviet Union to evict the settlers would have given 
way overnight, upon the termination of occupation, to a duty of the 
Baltic states, arising under human rights law, not to evict them. This 
result seems counter-intuitive, if not absurd. An international law 
norm requiring an occupant to evict settlers does not sit well with 
another international law norm prohibiting the legitimate sovereign 
from evicting. Therefore, whether or not an occupant is duty-bound 
to repatriate settlers illegally implanted in the occupied territory must 
be determined under the norms governing the obligation to make 
restitution and its exceptions. 
III. DOES INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
PROHIBIT THE REPATRIATION OF ISRAELI 
SETTLERS? 
Article 8 of the ECHR states that “[e]veryone has the right to 
respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence.”87 The ECtHR broadly construed the right to 
“private life” as protecting “the network of personal, social and 
economic relations that make up the private life of every human 
 
 85.  RONEN, TRANSITION FROM ILLEGAL REGIMES, supra note 10, at 216-17 
(providing a general review of the policy of Russification of the Baltic states, 
pursued by the Soviet occupant). 
 86.  See Slivenko v. Latvia, 2003-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 229, 260, 267 (concluding 
that the decision of Latvian authorities to expel the applicants to Russia violated 
the ECHR); RONEN, TRANSITION FROM ILLEGAL REGIMES, supra note 10, at 242-
44; Letter from Max van der Stoel, CSCE High Comm’r on Nat’l Minorities, to 
Georgs Andrejevs, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia (Jan. 25, 
1994), available at http://www.osce.org/hcnm/30612?download=true (“Massive 
expulsion of non-Latvian residents would be contrary to generally accepted 
international humanitarian principles.”). 
 87. See ECHR, supra note 38, art. 8: 
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. (2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the 
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic 
well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
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being.”88 This right thus applies to the plea of settled immigrants, 
including illegally implanted settlers, against repatriation.89 The 
ECtHR has noted: 
[A]s [a]rticle 8 also protects the right to establish and develop 
relationships with other human beings and the outside world and can 
sometimes embrace aspects of an individual’s social identity, it must be 
accepted that the totality of social ties between settled migrants and the 
community in which they are living constitutes part of the concept of 
“private life” within the meaning of [a]rticle 8 . . . [T]he expulsion of a 
settled migrant therefore constitutes an interference with his or her right to 
respect for private life.90 
The right to private life and the protection against repatriation that 
it affords to settlers are not absolute. Article 8 of the ECHR states 
that interfering with the rights under the article is permissible if it 
meets three cumulative requirements. First, the interference must be 
authorized under domestic law.91 Second, the interference must serve 
a legitimate aim.92 Article 8(2) sets forth an exhaustive list of 
legitimate aims: the interests of national security, public safety or 
economic well-being of the country, the prevention of disorder or 
crime, protection of health or morals, and the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others.93 Third, the interference must be “necessary 
in a democratic society.”94 The ECtHR ruled that a measure 
interfering with rights guaranteed by article 8 may be “necessary in a 
democratic society” only “if it has been taken in order to respond to a 
pressing social need and if the means employed are proportionate to 
the aims pursued.”95 The proportionality requirement calls for a 
balancing analysis by weighing the interests in interfering with the 
right to private life against the adverse consequences associated with 
such interference.96 The relative weight of the interests on both sides 
of the equation varies from case to case. 
 
 88.  Slivenko, 2003-X Eur. Ct. H.R. at 259. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Maslov v. Austria, 2008-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 301, 321 (2008). 
 91.  Slivenko, 2003-X Eur. Ct. H.R. at 260. 
 92.  Id.   
 93.  ECHR, supra note 38, art. 8(2). 
 94.  Id.; Slivenko, 2003-X Eur. Ct. H.R. at 260. 
 95.  Slivenko, 2003-X Eur. Ct. H.R. at 263. 
 96.  Id. 
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The right to private life contained in the ECHR directly applies to 
the case of Russian settlers implanted in the Baltic states by the 
Soviet occupant and to the case of the Turkish settlers in Northern 
Cyprus because both the occupying States and the legitimate 
sovereigns in these cases are parties to the ECHR. However, the 
ECHR has no direct bearing on the potential repatriation of Israeli 
settlers. The primary human rights instrument pertaining to the latter 
case is the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(“ICCPR”), to which Israel is a signatory and which a Palestinian 
State may also choose to join.97 Because most States are parties to the 
ICCPR, its provisions have arguably attained the status of customary 
international law, binding upon all states.98 It appears that the ICCPR 
does not protect immigrants who have not acquired the nationality of 
their state of residence against expulsion in a way that would be 
similar to the protection granted under article 8 of the ECHR. 
Article 12(4) of the ICCPR states that “no one shall be arbitrarily 
deprived of the right to enter his own country.”99 When interpreting 
the term “his own country” in Nystrom v. Australia, the U.N. Human 
Rights Committee (“HRC”) observed that: 
[It] is broader than the concept “country of his nationality.” It is not 
limited to nationality in a formal sense, that is, nationality acquired at 
birth or by conferral; it embraces, at the very least, an individual who, 
because of his or her special ties to or claims in relation to a given 
country, cannot be considered to be a mere alien. In this regard, [the 
Committee] finds that there are factors other than nationality which may 
establish close and enduring connections between a person and a country, 
connections which may be stronger than those of nationality. The words 
“his own country” invite consideration of such matters as long standing  
 
 97.  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A 
(XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 98.  See, e.g., Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protections of the 
Rights of Individuals Rather than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 32 (1982): 
The law of human rights as embodied in the international instruments is not merely 
treaty law, but rather has become a part of international customary law of general 
application, except in areas in which important reservations have been made. These 
documents do not create new rights; they recognize them. Although the line between 
codification and development of international law is a thin one, the consensus on 
virtually all provisions of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is so widespread 
that they can be considered part of the law of mankind, a jus cogens for all. 
 99.  ICCPR, supra note 97, art. 12(4). 
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residence, close personal and family ties and intentions to remain, as well 
as to the absence of such ties elsewhere.100 
The Nystrom decision departed from previous HRC jurisprudence 
that viewed formal nationality of the state of residence as generally a 
decisive criterion for protection against expulsion under article 12(4) 
of the ICCPR, regardless of the strength of the factual ties between 
individuals and their state of residence.101 Nystrom seems to narrow 
the gap between the protection granted to immigrants under article 
12(4) of the ICCPR and that under article 8 of the ECHR, but the 
convergence is far from complete. 
The balancing regime established under article 8 of the ECHR 
makes the right to private life far from absolute. By contrast, 
although the language of article 12(4) of the ICCPR prohibits only 
“arbitrary” interference with the right of individuals to enter their 
own country, the HRC interprets article 12(4) as a near-absolute 
prohibition against such interference. The HRC reasoned that, in 
accordance with the requirement of non-arbitrariness, any 
 
 100.  Human Rights Comm., Nystrom v. Australia, Comm. No. 1557/2007, 
para. 7.4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/102/D/1557/2007 (2011).  
 101.  See Human Rights Comm., Stewart v. Canada, Comm. No. 538/1993, 
para. 12.4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/58/D/538/1993 (1996) (specifying exceptional 
cases in which an immigrant’s state of residence might be considered her “own 
country” in the absence of a formal nationality link); Human Rights Comm., 
Madafferi v. Australia, Comm. No. 1011/2001, para. 9.6, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/81/D/1011/2001 (2004): 
[A] person who enters a State under the State’s immigration laws, and subject to the 
conditions of those laws, cannot normally regard that State as his ‘own country,’ when 
he has not acquired its nationality and continues to retain the nationality of his country 
of origin. An exception might only arise in limited circumstances, such as where 
unreasonable impediments are placed on the acquisition of nationality.  
See also Michelle Foster, “An ‘Alien’ by the Barest of Threads” – The Legality of 
the Deportation of Long-Term Residents from Australia, 33 MELB. U. L. REV. 483, 
519 (2009); Yaël Ronen, The Ties that Bind: Family and Private Life as Bars to 
the Deportation of Immigrants, 8 INT’L J.L. IN CONTEXT 283, 292 (2012) 
[hereinafter Ronen, The Ties that Bind] (commenting on HRC decisions in Stewart 
and Madafferi, “under the HRC’s jurisprudence, attachment to the territory through 
long-term presence does not suffice to protect a person from deportation . . . . 
Persons holding an effective nationality of another state who have not been 
unfairly denied the possibility of naturalization in the state of residence, are not 
protected by Article 12(4). Few ordinary long-term immigrants can therefore 
benefit from this provision.”).   
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deprivation of the right to enter one’s own country must be 
“reasonable in the particular circumstances” and that “there are few, 
if any, circumstances in which deprivation of the right to enter one’s 
own country could be reasonable.”102 
The legal consequences of the applicability of article 12(4) of the 
ICCPR—a near-absolute prohibition on expulsion—are thus far 
more drastic than the consequences of the applicability of article 8 of 
the ECHR, which is only the starting point of a balancing analysis 
that often may permit expulsion. This seems to affect the threshold 
for recognizing an interference with the right contained in article 
12(4) of the ICCPR, which is arguably higher than that for 
interference with the right to private life, protected under article 8 of 
the ECHR. The Nystrom decision suggests that, in the absence of a 
formal nationality link, the willingness of the HRC to regard the 
country of residence as an immigrant’s “own country” depends, to a 
considerable degree, on the “lack of any other ties than 
nationality”103 between the immigrant and her state of origin and on 
the immigrant’s lack of command of the language spoken in her 
country of origin.104 These considerations, which preclude regarding 
the occupied Palestinian territory as the Israeli settlers’ “own 
country,”105 do not appear to guide the ECtHR in determining 
whether the repatriation of a settled immigrant interferes with the 
right to private life,106 although they are considered relevant in 
determining the proportionality of such interference.107 
Moreover, the realm of social ties examined by the HRC in 
determining whether the state of residence is an immigrant’s own 
 
 102.  Nystrom, Comm. No. 1557/2007, para. 7.6 (emphasis added).   
 103.  Id. at para. 7.5. 
 104.   
[T]he author arrived in Australia when he was 27 days old, his nuclear family lives in 
Australia, he has no ties to Sweden and does not speak Swedish . . . . Given the 
particular circumstances of the case, the Committee considers that the author has 
established that Australia was his own country within the meaning of article 12, 
paragraph 4 of the Covenant, in the light of the strong ties connecting him to Australia, 
the presence of his family in Australia, the language he speaks, the duration of his stay 
in the country and the lack of any other ties than nationality with Sweden.  Id. 
 105.  Ronen, International Law, supra note 72, at 79 (observing the strong social 
and economic ties maintained by the Israeli settlers with Israel). 
 106.  Maslov v. Austria, 2008-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 301, 321; Slivenko v. Latvia, 
2003-X Eur. Ct. H.R. at 259. 
 107.  Slivenko, 2003-X Eur. Ct. H.R. at 259-60.  
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country extends beyond the immigrant’s immediate social 
surrounding. The HRC requires a significant level of integration of 
the immigrant within the larger community; in other words, ties with 
the State must be substantial enough to substitute for the lack of 
formal nationality.108 Such a requirement is not a condition for 
proving interference with the right to private life under article 8 of 
the ECHR.109 Given the almost complete insulation of Israeli settlers 
from the larger Palestinian society and the grave hostility between 
the two communities, the integration requirement presented by the 
HRC also precludes the applicability of article 12(4) to Israeli 
settlers. 
Article 17 of the ICCPR protects everyone from “arbitrary or 
unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home.”110 The HRC 
interpreted the term “privacy” narrowly as referring only to isolation 
from society and protection of personal information.111 Thus, the 
HRC interpretation of the right to privacy differs from the ECtHR 
interpretation of the right to a private life. Unlike the latter, the 
former does not protect “the network of personal, social and 
 
 108. See Nystrom, Comm. No. 1557/2007, para. 7.5:  
[H]is ties to the Australian community are so strong that he was considered to be an 
‘absorbed member of the Australian community’ by the Australian Full Court in its 
judgment dated 30 June 2005; he bore many of the duties of a citizen and was treated 
like one, in several aspects related to his civil and political rights such as the right to 
vote in local elections or to serve in the army. Furthermore, the author alleges that he 
never acquired the Australian nationality because he thought he was an Australian 
citizen. The author argues that he was placed under the guardianship of the State since 
he was 13 years old and that the State party never initiated any citizenship process for 
all the period it acted on the author’s behalf. The Committee observes that the State 
party has not refuted the latter argument. 
See also Rishi Gulati, Resolving Dual and Multiple Nationality Dispute in a 
Globalised World, 28 IMMIGR. ASYLUM & NATIONALITY L. 27, 38 (2014) 
(observing that the HRC “used essentially the ‘effective nationality’ test to 
determine Nystrom’s ‘own country,’” and considered Australia to be Nystrom’s 
“own country” because “Nystrom exhibits all the characteristics of an Australian 
national,” although he has not obtained formal Australian nationality). 
 109.  Slivenko, 2003-X Eur. Ct. H.R. at 259. 
 110.  ICCPR, supra note 97, art. 17. 
 111.  See U.N. Human Rights Comm., CCPR General Comment No. 16: 
Article 17 (Right to Privacy) The Right to Respect of Privacy, Family, Home and 
Correspondence, and Protection of Honour and Reputation, ¶¶ 8-10, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. (Apr. 8, 1988) [hereinafter CCPR General Comment No. 
16].  
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economic relations” 112 forged by individuals.113 
Expelling certain non-national immigrants may be prohibited 
under article 17 as an arbitrary interference with one’s family. In 
Winata v. Australia,114 the HRC considered an application of an 
Indonesian couple facing deportation from Australia after illegally 
residing there for fourteen years. The couple had a thirteen-year-old 
child who had received Australian citizenship and was therefore 
entitled to remain in the country.115 The HRC took the view that: 
[A] decision of the State party to deport two parents and to compel the 
family to choose whether a 13-year old child, who has attained citizenship 
of the State party after living there 10 years, either remains alone in the 
State party or accompanies his parents is to be considered ‘interference’ 
with the family, at least in circumstances where, as here, substantial 
changes to long-settled family life would follow in either case.116  
The Committee followed the same approach in Madafferi v. 
Australia,117 under similar circumstances.118 
The deportation decisions reviewed in Winata and Madafferi did 
not amount to direct interference with the unity of the family because 
the families in question could possibly relocate together.119 The 
Winata dissent noted that it was not a case in which the State’s 
decision “results in the inevitable separation between members of the 
 
 112.  Slivenko, 2003-X Eur. Ct. H.R. at 259. 
 113.  When reviewing decisions of state authorities to expel immigrants, the 
HRC opinions do not indicate that the prohibition against arbitrary interference 
with one’s privacy extends to protect immigrants against expulsion. See also  
CCPR General Comment No. 16, supra note 111, ¶¶ 8-10; see generally Nystrom, 
Comm. No. 1557/2007; Madafferi, Comm. No. 1011/2001; Stewart, Comm. No. 
538/1993; infra notes 114-16, 129-32. 
 114.  Human Rights Comm., Winata v. Australia, Comm. No. 930/2000, para. 
7.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/72/D/930/2000 (2001). 
 115.  See id. at para. 7.2. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Human Rights Comm., Madafferi v. Australia, Comm. No. 1011/2001, 
paras. 9.7-9.8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/81/D/1011/2001 (2004). 
 118.  Id. (considering whether deporting a father to Italy and compelling his 
family with four children to choose whether to accompany him or stay in Australia 
amounts to “interference” with the family).  
 119.  See Ronen, The Ties that Bind, supra note 101, at 290 (arguing that these 
decisions extended protection against deportation to “cases where the unity of the 
family was not necessarily at issue, since the possibility of relocating together was 
possible”).   
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family.”120 Some commentators have understood the Winata and 
Madafferi decisions to equate any State action that results in 
“substantial changes to long-settled family life”121 with “interference 
with the family.”122 According to this view, article 17 “protects 
against deportation not only the unity of the family but also the 
family or its individual members in their social environment.”123 
This reading of Winata and Madafferi supports extending the 
protection afforded by article 17 of the ICCPR to situations in which 
none of the family members are nationals of the state of residence, 
provided that at least some family members have developed close 
ties with the social environment in that State and repatriation would 
therefore upset “long-settled family life.” Such reading of HRC 
jurisprudence goes a long way to assimilate article 17 of the ICCPR 
with article 8 of the ECHR,124 so that the two provisions differ only 
with respect to adult immigrants “who are attached to the state of 
residence, but have no formal family relationships there.”125 
Reading Winata and Madafferi to mean that any State action 
resulting in “substantial changes” to the long-settled life of 
individual family members is an “interference with the family” 
appears to be an overreach. The Winata and Madafferi deportation 
decisions clearly, if indirectly, compromised the unity of the family 
by imposing a high price on maintaining such unity. These 
circumstances hardly support understanding the HRC jurisprudence 
as extending the protection against deportation, emanating from the 
right against interference with one’s family, to cases in which 
deportation would neither directly interfere with the unity of the 
family nor attach a price to maintaining such unity.126 Therefore, the 
 
 120.  Winata, Comm. No. 930/2000, Annex, para. 3.  
 121.  Winata, Comm. No. 930/2000, para. 7.2.  
 122.  See Foster, supra note 101, at 534 (“[I]t is clear that where deportation will 
result in ‘substantial changes to long-settled family life’ the Australian government 
is required to balance ‘the State party’s reasons for the removal of the person 
concerned’ on the one hand and, ‘on the other, the degree of hardship the family 
and its members would encounter as a consequence of such removal.’”); Ronen, 
The Ties that Bind, supra note 101, at 291.  
 123.  Ronen, The Ties that Bind, supra note 101, at 291. 
 124.  Id. (commenting on the decision of the HRC in Winata, Ronen observed 
that “[t]he result resembles the ‘private life’ jurisprudence under ECHR Article 8. 
The Committee’s majority may well have been attempting to follow the ECtHR”). 
 125.  RONEN, TRANSITION FROM ILLEGAL REGIMES, supra note 10, at 199.   
 126.  See Human Rights Comm., Ngambi v. France, Comm. No. 1179/2003, 
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protection against interference with the family provided by article 17 
of the ICCPR does not extend to deportations of entire families of 
non-national immigrants. 
Article 17 also protects individuals from interference with their 
“home.”127 In its General Comment No. 16, the HRC observed that 
the term “home” refers to “the place where a person resides or carries 
out his usual occupation.”128 Although any deportation of long-term 
immigrants inherently entails removing them from their place of 
residence, the HRC has never considered the protection against 
interference with one’s home as a bar to deportation. The HRC 
examined the protection against expulsion provided to immigrants 
under article 17 only in relation to interference with the family. In 
Canepa v. Canada,129 the HRC reviewed a decision of the Canadian 
authorities to deport an immigrant who invoked his right against 
interference both with his family and with his home.130 A finding that 
the complainant “has neither spouse nor children in Canada [and] has 
extended family in Italy”131 sufficed for the Committee to conclude 
that such deportation would not violate Article 17.132 General 
Comment No. 16 and the Committee’s jurisprudence clearly suggest 
that the Committee “attached no weight to social ties as ‘home’ for 
the purpose of Article 17.”133 It therefore appears that “settlers cannot 
 
para. 6.4, Doc. CCPR/C/81/D/1179/2003 (2004) (emphasizing that the right 
against interference with the family concerns the protection of “a family bond”); 
MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR 
COMMENTARY 229 (1993) (indicating that the prohibition against interference with 
the family protects “interpersonal relationships”); Richard Burchill, The Right to 
Live Wherever You Want? The Right to Family Life Following the UN Human 
Rights Committee’s Decision in Winata, 21 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 225, 244 (2003) 
(observing, with regard to the HRC decision in Winata, that once the child who is a 
citizen of Australia becomes a self-sufficient adult, “Australia will be able to 
remove the parents as family life can easily be maintained through visits, phone 
calls and other means”); see also DAVID HARRIS ET AL., LAW OF THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 375-76 (2d ed. 2009) (“The essential ingredient 
of family life is the right to live together so that family relationships may ‘develop 
normally’ and that members of the family may ‘enjoy each other’s company”).  
 127.  ICCPR, supra note 97, art. 17.  
 128.  CCPR General Comment No. 16, supra note 111, ¶ 5. 
 129.  Human Rights Comm., Canepa v. Canada, Comm. No. 558/1993, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/59/D/558/1993 (1997)   
 130.  Id. at para. 11.4.  
 131.  Id. at para. 11.5. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  See RONEN, TRANSITION FROM ILLEGAL REGIMES, supra note 10, at 200 
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successfully challenge their expulsion on the ground that it 
constitutes a violation of their home.”134 
The standard of protection that currently applies to Turkish and 
Russian settlers under article 8 of the ECHR may eventually apply to 
Israeli settlers as well, in light of future developments of the HRC 
interpretation of ICCPR rights. However, would a balancing regime 
of the type established under article 8 of the ECHR preclude 
repatriating Israeli settlers? Answering this question in the negative, 
Yael Ronen identified four interests that a Palestinian post-transition 
regime would have in repatriating the Israeli settlers, which 
correspond to the legitimate grounds for expulsion stipulated under 
article 8 of the ECHR.135 
First, “the protection of the rights and freedoms of others” 
includes the protection of the right to self-determination.136 The 
presence of many Israeli settlers in the Palestinian territory may 
jeopardize the Palestinian people’s ability to exercise its right to self-
determination because it is likely to facilitate interference on the part 
of Israel in the internal affairs of the Palestinian state by political or 
military means.137 Second, the presence of a settler population raises 
national security concerns because it may amount to “presence of 
foreign military forces on the post-transition regime’s territory.”138 
These concerns are heightened in the case of Israeli settlers because 
of their relatively high military capacities.139 Third, the post-
transition regime may wish to remove settlers for the “economic 
wellbeing of the country” because the presence of Israeli settlers 
adversely affects the local population’s ability to enjoy the land and 
its limited natural resources.140 Fourth, corresponding to the purpose 
 
(“The HRC’s General Comment on Article 17 also suggests that the acceptable 
interpretation is limited to ‘home’ as a tangible structure rather than as a social 
institution”). 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
 136.  RONEN, TRANSITION FROM ILLEGAL REGIMES, supra note 10, at 207.  
 137.  Ronen, International Law, supra note 72, at 77-78  
 138.  RONEN, TRANSITION FROM ILLEGAL REGIMES, supra note 10, at 208. 
 139.  Ronen, International Law, supra note 72, at 79 (noting that a large 
proportion of Israeli settlers have had military training and experience). 
 140.  Id. at 79-80 (noting that the presence of large numbers of settlers creates 
disputes of private property and conflicts over the public distribution of natural 
resources); see also RONEN, TRANSITION FROM ILLEGAL REGIMES, supra note 10, 
at 212. 
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of preventing disorder or crime, are the immense resources that 
would be required to guarantee the safety of the Israeli settler 
population in light of the grave hostility that exists between the 
settlers and the local Palestinian population.141 
Weighing the interference in the lives of Israeli settlers that would 
result from their repatriation against the interests of the local 
Palestinian population and those of the legitimate sovereign in 
pursuing such a measure, Ronen concluded that repatriating the 
settlers survives the proportionality test and is therefore permissible 
under international human rights law.142 By contrast, the same 
balancing formula has led Ronen to conclude that “in both the Baltic 
states and Cyprus, international law protects the right of settlers to 
remain in the territory.”143 
The Russian and Turkish settlers fare better than their Israeli 
counterparts in Ronen’s balancing analysis because of several 
distinguishing features: (a) the strong social and economic ties 
maintained by the Israeli settlers with their state of nationality would 
likely mitigate the adverse consequences of their repatriation;144 (b) 
Israel’s argument that its control over the West Bank is essential for 
its safety increases the likelihood that Israel would attempt to 
influence the future Palestinian state through the settlers 
population;145 (c) the grave and long-standing hostility between the 
Israeli settlers and the local Palestinian population increases the 
likelihood that the continued presence of the settlers would incite 
violence within the future Palestinian state.146 Moreover, Ronen 
argued that Israeli settlers are more likely than their Turkish 
counterparts to have been aware, at the time of their migration, that 
their settlement in an occupied territory violates international law 
and that this type of good faith analysis provides another ground for 
 
 141.  Ronen, International Law, supra note 72, at 81-82 (arguing that the cost of 
protecting Israeli settlers in a Palestinian state would be enormous). 
 142.  Id. at 91 (comparing the proportionality test results of Cyprus, the Baltics, 
and the West Bank). 
 143.  RONEN, TRANSITION FROM ILLEGAL REGIMES, supra note 10, at 242-43. 
 144.  Ronen, International Law, supra note 72, at 79. 
 145.  Id. at 82 (pointing to a high likelihood that Israel, after a withdrawal from 
the West Bank, will continue to influence the future of the Palestinian state due to 
the continued presence of settlements). 
 146.  Id. at 82, 84 (describing the probability of continued hostility between the 
Palestinian population and the remaining Israeli settlers). 
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distinguishing the Israeli from the Russian and Turkish settlers when 
considering the proportionality of expulsion.147 Assessing 
individuals’ awareness of their State’s violation of international law 
in determining the degree of protection granted to such individuals 
under international law raises serious fairness concerns.148 However, 
the claim that a balancing analysis of the type required under article 
8 of the ECHR would permit the repatriation of Israeli settlers is 
plausible. 
Does this balancing model also extend to the sphere of State 
Responsibility Rules? Does an exception to the obligation to make 
restitution, relieving Israel of the duty to repatriate the settlers, have 
to be justified under a strict balancing-of-interest analysis that 
weighs the interests of the settlers against those of the local 
population and of the legitimate sovereign? Section IV answers this 
question in the negative. 
IV. STATE RESPONSIBILITY RULES AND THE 
INTERESTS OF ILLEGALLY IMPLANTED 
SETTLERS: IS STRICT BALANCING OF 
INTERESTS REQUIRED? 
In Demopoulos, the ECtHR rejected the notion that “a Contracting 
State must pursue a blanket policy of restoring property to owners 
without taking into account the current use or occupation of the 
property in question.”149 Having determined that the applicants’ 
restitution claims must be determined with regard to each property 
on a case-by-case basis, the Court also concluded that States must be 
allowed to choose how to redress breaches of property rights because 
they are in “the best position to assess the practicalities, priorities and 
conflicting interests on a domestic level even in a situation such as 
that pertaining in the northern part of Cyprus.”150 
The Court has clearly rejected not only the view that exceptions to 
restitution must be limited to physical impossibility, but also the 
basic formula that restitution is the rule and its denial is the 
 
 147.  Id. at 86-88. 
 148.  See infra Section V (discussing whether protection of settlers under 
international law depends on good-faith analysis). 
 149.  Demopoulos v. Turkey, 2010-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 365, 411-12.  
 150.  Id. at 412.  
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exception.151 The Court rejected this formula partly because the 
weight of the Greek-Cypriot refugees’ interests in restitution had 
diminished with the passage of time.152 The Court, however, was also 
aware of the large number of current occupiers of the expropriated 
property. The language used by the Court suggests it was wary of 
international law imposing a positive obligation on a State to 
interfere with the lives of a large number of individuals. In the words 
of the Court: 
It cannot be within this Court’s task in interpreting and applying the 
provisions of the Convention to impose an unconditional obligation on a 
Government to embark on the forcible eviction and rehousing of 
potentially large numbers of men, women and children even with the aim 
of vindicating the rights of victims of violations of the Convention.153 
This statement does not merely clarify that denying restitution 
may extend beyond physical impossibility and that claims for 
restitution must be considered on a case-by-case basis taking into 
account the interests of third parties. It also represents a “not by my 
hand” pronouncement by the Court, which seems repulsed by the 
notion that international law should impose a positive obligation on a 
State that entails, in the somewhat emotional language used by the 
Court, “the forcible eviction and rehousing of potentially large 
numbers of men, women and children.”154 
This position may explain the Court’s approach toward the 
balancing process required of Turkey. The requirement that States 
consider claims to restitution on a case-by-case basis, taking into 
account the interests of the particular individuals involved, does not 
preclude the Court from handing down guidelines for a balancing 
process.155 Former Israeli Chief Justice, Aharon Barak, has observed 
 
 151.  See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.  
 152.  See Demopoulos, 2010-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 410 (“[T]he Court can only 
conclude that the attenuation over time of the link between the holding of title and 
the possession and use of the property in question must have consequences on the 
nature of the redress that can be regarded as fulfilling the requirements of Article 
35 § 1 of the Convention.”). 
 153.  Id. at 411.  
 154.  Id. 
 155.  See, e.g., Maslov v. Austria, 2008-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 301, 320 (listing 
guidelines for balancing analyses that concern the permissibility of interference 
with the right to a private life).   
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that principled balancing, which is “based on a general ‘formula’ that 
can be applied in similar cases,” is preferable to ad hoc balancing, 
which is guided only by “the baseline determination that one should 
balance the competing principles according to what the 
circumstances of the case require,” because the latter is more 
susceptible to arbitrariness.156 
The interest in conducting principled balancing, guided by general 
criteria set forth by the ECtHR, possibly gains significance given the 
large number of restitution claims that Turkey must consider. The 
guidelines might require Turkey to take into account the period of 
residence of current occupiers in the expropriated property, the 
period of residence of the dispossessed owners in the property before 
its expropriation, and whether or not the dispossessed owners built 
the dwelling in dispute.157 Guidelines for balancing analyses might 
also distinguish between two categories of current occupiers of 
Greek-Cypriot property: Cypriot-Turks who have fled from Southern 
Cyprus where they lost their homes and Turkish settlers who have 
migrated from the mainland.158 
Yet, the Court has not attempted to lay out any guidelines for 
balancing analyses that weigh the interests of the applicants against 
those of the present occupiers of the property. The Court did not 
provide any examples of circumstances, beyond the passage of time 
since the dispossession of the Greek-Cypriot owners, which the IPC 
should typically consider. 
The Demopoulos judgment did not examine whether primary 
norms of international human rights law protect current occupiers of 
 
 156.  Aharon Barak, Forward: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme 
Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 95-96 (2002) (recommending that 
judges “formulate a rational principle that reflects a criterion that incorporates a 
principled guideline, thus distancing themselves from a random paternalistic 
criterion, whose directions and nature cannot be anticipated”) (internal citations 
omitted).   
 157.  Examples of these general criteria can be found in the plan for the 
reunification of Cyprus submitted in 2004 by the Secretary General of the UN at 
the time, Kofi Annan. See The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem, 
HELLENIC RES. INS. (Mar. 31, 2004), art. 10, http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/ 
Annan_Plan_April2004.pdf (laying out, among others, principles for resolving 
conflicting claims to property by the dispossessed owners and the current 
occupiers of the property).   
 158.  Id. at arts. 10(3)(d), 10(3)(f).  
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the property against eviction.159 Rather, the case concerned State 
Responsibility Rules, and the Court examined Turkey’s obligation to 
redress violations of international law resulting from the 
dispossession of Greek-Cypriots.160 However, underlying the Court’s 
reluctance to lay down a robust balancing regime that would qualify 
Turkey’s otherwise near-absolute discretion in examining restitution 
claims is the ethos of international human rights law, which is 
governed by strong anti-utilitarian sentiment. Commentators have 
observed that human rights law “insists that the rights of negatively 
affected individuals are inviolable and cannot be canceled out in a 
utilitarian calculus.”161 To be sure, the balancing model that prevails 
in international human rights jurisprudence represents a certain 
departure from this anti-utilitarian ethos. Moreover, in several 
decisions, the ECtHR recognized that international human rights law 
may require the balancing of competing human rights, which may 
result not only in a negative duty of a State not to interfere with the 
rights of individuals, but also in a positive duty to interfere with the 
human rights of one person to secure the rights of another.162 The 
Court demonstrated, however, a certain degree of reluctance to 
engage in a balancing of interests that may yield such positive 
obligation, affording States a wide margin of appreciation with 
 
 159.  See generally, Demopoulos v. Turkey, 2010-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 365.   
 160.  See id.  
 161.  Adam McBeth, A Right by Any Other Name: The Evasive Engagement of 
International Financial Institutions with Human Rights, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. 
REV. 1101, 1124 (2009). 
 162.  Evans v. United Kingdom, 2007-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 353, 381 (concerning an 
applicant that requested to use embryos she created jointly with her former spouse 
notwithstanding the latter’s objection and recognizing that the case concerned “a 
conflict between the Article 8 rights of two private individuals . . . each person’s 
interest is entirely irreconcilable with the other’s”). The ECtHR observed that:  
Although the object of Article 8 [of the ECHR] is essentially that of protecting the 
individual against arbitrary interference by the public authorities, it does not merely 
compel the State to abstain from such interference: in addition to this primarily 
negative undertaking, there may be positive obligations inherent in an effective respect 
for private life. These obligations may involve the adoption of measures designed to 
secure respect for private life even in the sphere of the relations of individuals between 
themselves . . . regard must be had to the fair balance which has to be struck between 
the competing interests; and in both contexts the State enjoys a certain margin of 
appreciation. 
 Id.; see also Odièvre v. France, App. No. 42326/98 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 13, 2003) 
(Wildhaber et al., J., dissenting). 
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respect to “the relations of individuals between themselves.”163 The 
Demopoulos decision suggests that a model of robust balancing 
analysis cannot survive in situations in which its application results 
in international law requiring a State to interfere with the lives of a 
large number of individuals on grounds that are unrelated to 
misconduct. It seems that a balancing requirement that yields such 
interference strays too far from the anti-utilitarian ethos underlying 
human rights law. 
The ECtHR rejected the balancing model in yet another case when 
applying an exception that concerns the protection of individuals to 
an obligation under State Responsibility Rules. These Rules decree 
that States are obligated to neither recognize a situation created by a 
serious breach of a peremptory norm of general international law as 
lawful, nor render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation 
(“obligation of non-recognition”).164 This rule of customary 
international law prohibits States from recognizing the validity of 
acts performed by an illegal regime. However, in the Namibia 
Advisory Opinion, in 1971, the ICJ recognized an exception to the 
obligation of non-recognition (the “Namibia exception”), which 
considers the interests of individuals residing in territory controlled 
by the illegal regime.165 Noting the obligation of States not to 
recognize the acts of the illegal regime established by South Africa  
 
 163.  Odièvre, App. No. 42326/98, para. 46 (“The Court reiterates that the 
choice of the means calculated to secure compliance with Article 8 in the sphere of 
the relations of individuals between themselves is in principle a matter that falls 
within the Contracting States’ margin of appreciation”); see also Evans, 2007-I 
Eur. Ct. H.R. at 382; Lorenzo Zucca, Evans v United Kingdom: Frozen Embryos 
and Conflicting Rights, 11 EDINBURGH L. REV. 446, 448 (2007) (distinguishing 
horizontal conflict between competing human rights from vertical conflict between 
a public interest and a human right, Zucca observes that the ECtHR in Evans 
“seems more at ease with the vertical conflict of interests rather than with the 
horizontal conflict of rights,” because, in the view of the Court, balancing between 
competing rights to private life “would amount to arbitrariness”).   
 164.  Draft Articles, supra note 14, art. 41 (“No state shall recognize as lawful a 
situation created by a serious breach within the meaning of article 40, nor render 
aid or assistance in maintaining that situation”).  
 165.  Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa 
in Namibia (South-West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 
(1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 44 (June 21) [hereinafter Namibia 
Advisory Opinion].   
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in Namibia, the ICJ stated: 
[N]on-recognition . . . should not result in depriving the people of 
Namibia of any advantages derived from international co-operation. In 
particular, while official acts performed by the Government of South 
Africa on behalf of or concerning Namibia after the termination of the 
Mandate are illegal and invalid, this invalidity cannot be extended to 
those acts, such as, for instance, the registration of births, deaths and 
marriages, the effects of which can be ignored only to the detriment of the 
inhabitants of the Territory.166 
Delineating the contours of the exception to the non-recognition 
obligation, the Namibia Advisory Opinion referred only to ex post 
facto recognition of acts of routine administration, such as the 
registration of births, marriages, and deaths.167 However, “[t]he 
increasingly voluminous body of human rights law has had an 
important effect on the obligation of non-recognition and on the 
exception to it.”168 Thus, in recent years, the ECtHR has adopted a 
broad construction of the Namibia exception, which provides for a 
broad ex ante recognition of an illegal regime’s legal authority to the 
extent that such authority is necessary for complying with the 
positive obligations of the regime to ensure and protect human rights. 
The ECtHR has thus recognized the validity of criminal laws enacted 
by the illegal regime of the TRNC on the ground that criminal 
legislation is an essential instrument for the protection of human 
rights and its invalidity would be detrimental to the local 
population.169 The Court emphasized that this conclusion did not 
 
 166.  Id. . 
 167.  Id.  
 168.  RONEN, TRANSITION FROM ILLEGAL REGIMES, supra note 10, at 88.  
 169.  Recognizing the validity of criminal laws enacted by the “TRNC”, the 
ECtHR observed:  
The Court recalls that the overall control exercised by Turkey over the territory of 
northern Cyprus entails her responsibility for the policies and actions of the “TRNC” 
and that those affected by such policies or actions come within the “jurisdiction” of 
Turkey for the purposes of [a]rticle 1 of the Convention with the consequence that 
Turkey is accountable for violations of Convention rights which take place within that 
territory. It would not be consistent with such responsibility under the Convention if 
the adoption by the authorities of the “TRNC” of civil, administrative or criminal law 
measures, or their application or enforcement within that territory, were to be denied 
any validity or regarded as having no “lawful” basis in terms of the Convention.  
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undermine the international community’s position regarding the 
illegality of the TRNC regime.170 Little doubt, however, exists that 
the ECtHR broadly recognizing the legal authority of the TRNC 
“benefits the purported sovereignty of the illegal regime.”171 Indeed, 
“[t]his jurisprudence provides such a wide exceptional validity under 
the Namibia exception, that little remains of the obligation of non-
recognition insofar as internal acts are concerned.”172 
The ECtHR did not subject its willingness to recognize the 
legislative powers of the illegal regime to any balancing analysis.173 
It did not weigh the benefits of the legislation in question for the 
local population against the interests compromised by broadly 
recognizing the legal authority of the illegal regime, particularly the 
interests of the ousted sovereign and the interest in vindicating the 
international legal order.174 It has been observed that expanding the 
Namibia exception is “an inevitable consequence of the expansion of 
international human rights law, which was not fully envisaged in 
1971.”175 Thus, the ECtHR jurisprudence expanding the Namibia 
exception is another example of the Court rejecting the balancing 
model in applying an exception that concerns the protection of a 
large number of individuals to an obligation under State 
Responsibility Rules. 
The reluctance of international law to require a State to interfere 
with the lives of a large number of individuals, even as a means of 
amending previous violations of international law, also affects the 
 
Foka v. Turkey, App. No. 28940/95, para. 83 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 24, 2008), 
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-87175; 
see also Protopapa v. Turkey, App. No. 16084/90, para. 94 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 24, 
2009), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-
91499. 
 170.  Foka, App. No. 28940/95, para. 84. 
 171.  RONEN, TRANSITION FROM ILLEGAL REGIMES, supra note 10, at 95; see 
Martin Dawidowicz, The Obligation of Non-Recognition of an Unlawful Situation, 
in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 677, 678 (James Crawford et al. 
eds., 2010) (“As a minimum, the rationale of the obligation of non-recognition is to 
prevent, in so far as possible, the validation of an unlawful situation by seeking to 
ensure that a fait accompli resulting from serious illegalities do not consolidate and 
crystallize over time into situations recognized by the international legal order.”).  
 172.  RONEN, TRANSITION FROM ILLEGAL REGIMES, supra note 10, at 92. 
 173.  See Protopapa v. Turkey, App. No. 16084/90; Foka, App. No. 28940/95.   
 174.  Id.   
 175.  RONEN, TRANSITION FROM ILLEGAL REGIMES, supra note 10, at 94.   
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international law approach toward the claims of victims of mass 
dislocations to return to their country. Although both the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the ICCPR recognize that 
everyone has the right to enter one’s own country,176 “scholars 
generally have viewed it to apply only to an individual but not to 
individuals belonging to a [dislocated] mass group.”177 Moreover, the 
prevailing view in the legal literature holds that the right of return 
following mass dislocation of populations has not been accepted as a 
norm of customary international law.178 One of the main 
considerations underlying this approach concerns the potential 
interference with the lives of many current occupiers of the property 
that the refugees left behind because the claim of refugees to return 
to their country is typically linked to their claim to repossess such 
property.179 Indeed, the return of refugees to their country is often 
practical only if the State recognizes their claim to repossession.180 
 
 176.  ICCPR, supra note 97, art. 12(4) (“No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of 
the right to enter his own country.”); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. 
Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948), art. 13(2) [hereinafter 
UDHR] (“Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to 
return to his country.”).   
 177.  Eric Rosand, The Right to Return Under International Law Following 
Mass Dislocation: The Bosnia Precedent?, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1091, 1095 
(1998); see also Eyal Benvenisti & Eyal Zamir, Private Claims to Property Rights 
in the Future Israeli-Palestinian Settlement, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 295, 324-25 
(1995):  
International practice . . . does not support the claim that the right of return following 
mass relocation of populations is recognized under international law. This observation 
of state practice is enhanced by the lack of support in legal literature for the right of 
refugees to return to the country they have fled. Despite persistent calls for the 
recognition of such a right, mainly by German and Palestinian jurists, the prevailing 
view is that this right is not recognized in human rights instruments such as the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, and that it is yet to be generally accepted as part of customary law. 
HURST HANNUM, THE RIGHT TO LEAVE AND RETURN IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
PRACTICE 59 (1987) (“There is no evidence that mass movements of groups such 
as refugees or displaced persons were intended to be included within the scope of 
article 12 of the Covenant by its drafters”). 
 178.  Benvenisti & Zamir, supra note 177, at 325. 
 179.  Id. at 328-29 (stating that the main concern rests in the “interest and 
expectations” of current possessors who relied on domestic laws to gain possession 
of the property that the refugees have left behind); see Rosand, supra note 177, at 
1101-03 (observing that one of the obstacles to the return of Bosnian refugees is 
the tension between their claim to repossess their properties and the claims of 
current occupiers of the property). 
 180.  Id. 
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Here, the protection of current occupiers of the property of 
refugees takes the form of restrictively interpreting a primary norm 
of international human rights law (i.e., the right of everyone to enter 
one’s own country).181 Such an interpretation does not provide for a 
balancing of interests that takes into account the circumstances of 
each situation.182 It is premised, in part, on the recognition that 
international law should never impose a positive obligation on a 
State that is likely to result in interference with the lives of a large 
number of individuals. 
In sum, international law is reluctant to impose a positive 
obligation to interfere with the lives of a large number of individuals 
upon States. Therefore, the inquiry into whether international human 
rights law prohibits repatriating illegally implanted settlers is 
fundamentally different from whether State Responsibility Rules 
exempt the occupant from bringing about repatriation. An exemption 
under the latter does not depend on a prohibition under the former. 
The inquiry into whether the interests of individual settlers have 
attained sufficient legal significance to support an exception to an 
occupant’s duty to make restitution (i.e., repatriate the settlers) seems 
far from the strict balancing of interest analysis that prevails in 
international human rights law. Rather, State Responsibility Rules 
seem to recognize an exception to the obligation of restitution 
whenever imposing such obligation would result in the “forcible 
eviction and rehousing of potentially large numbers of men, women 
and children.”183 
V. DOES THE PROTECTION OF SETTLERS UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW DEPEND ON GOOD-FAITH 
ANALYSIS? 
The ILC commentary regarding the scope of the material 
impossibility exception to the restitution obligation recognizes that 
“in certain cases, the position of third parties may have to be taken 
into account in considering whether restitution is materially 
possible.”184 The ILC notes, however, that “whether the position of a 
 
 181.  Benvenisti & Zamir, supra note 177, at 324-25. 
 182.  Id.   
 183.  Demopoulos v. Turkey, 2010-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 365, 411.  
 184.  Draft Articles, supra note 14, art. 35 (commentary).  
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third party will preclude restitution will depend on the circumstances, 
including whether the third party at the time of entering into the 
transaction or assuming the disputed rights was acting in good faith 
and without notice of the claim to restitution.”185 
Several commentators have resorted to good-faith analysis in 
applying either international human rights law or State 
Responsibility Rules to the claims of individuals who are the 
beneficiaries of a State’s violation of international law. Addressing 
the scope of protection granted to such individuals under State 
Responsibility Rules, Eyal Benvenisti views that “the good faith of 
the individual who benefited from the consequences of the breach is 
a necessary condition for upholding her claim.”186 Benvenisti thus 
maintains that “the expectations of citizens who took part in or 
benefited from illegal acts knowing that these acts violated the law of 
occupation . . . do not merit respect.”187 
Similarly, Yael Ronen relies on good-faith analysis to examine the 
extent of protection against repatriation granted under international 
human rights law to settlers illegally implanted in an occupied 
territory. Observing that such protection turns largely on the 
proportionality requirement,188 Ronen contends that “the 
proportionality of expulsion is measured, inter alia, against the 
behavior of the individual” and “[a] person acting in good faith is 
entitled to greater consideration than one who has deliberately acted 
in bad faith.”189 
Contrasting the Turkish settlers of Northern Cyprus with the 
Israeli settlers of the West Bank, Ronen observes that whereas the 
migration of the former was voluntary, induced by promises of a 
higher quality of life, it was also characterized by “ignorance of the 
political and legal circumstances that concern the new habitat, the 
legal status of the territory and its consequences regarding the status 
 
 185.  Id.   
 186.  BENVENISTI, supra note 3, at 313. 
 187.  Id. 
 188.  Yaël Ronen, Status of Settlers Implanted by Illegal Regimes Under 
International Law 55, 67 (Int’l L. Forum, Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem, Research 
Paper No. 11-08, 2008) [hereinafter Ronen, Status of Settlers] (highlighting that 
the proportionality test comes out with different results when determining the 
extent of protection against repatriation).  
 189.  Id. at 68.  
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of the settlers.”190 Ronen attributes such ignorance to the low level of 
education among the Turkish settlers, arguing that many of them 
may have not known where Cyprus was located before arriving 
there.191 
By contrast, Ronen observes that: 
[T]he status of the [Israeli] settlements has been, and still is, a central part 
of the political and legal discourse in Israel. Although not every settler is 
an expert of international law, only few among the inhabitants of the 
settlements are completely unaware of the political and legal ramifications 
of the settlement activity.192 
Ronen also observes that, whereas the Turkish settlers were not 
politically motivated, many of the Israeli settlers migrated into the 
occupied territory intending to influence its status.193 Using a good-
faith analysis as one of her considerations, Ronen concludes that 
international human rights law prohibits the repatriation of the 
Turkish settlers of Northern Cyprus,194 but it does not provide a 
similar protection to the Israeli settlers of the Palestinian occupied 
territory.195 
This type of good-faith analysis is problematic, however, because 
it indirectly requires individuals to follow norms that do not apply to 
them, attaching a price tag to conduct that ignores such norms. The 
international prohibition against an occupying State settling its 
nationals within the occupied territory is binding upon the occupying 
State itself and upon state officials who are in a position to facilitate 
such settlement, but it is not binding upon individual settlers.196 
 
 190.  Ronen, International Law, supra note 72, at 87 (author’s translation). 
 191.  RONEN, TRANSITION FROM ILLEGAL REGIMES, supra note 10, at 233. 
 192.  Ronen, International Law, supra note 72, at 87 (author’s translation).  
 193.  Id.; see also RONEN, TRANSITION FROM ILLEGAL REGIMES, supra note 10, 
at 233 (observing that the Turkish settlers “were not politically motivated in 
coming”). 
 194.  RONEN, TRANSITION FROM ILLEGAL REGIMES, supra note 10, at 242-43 
(using international human rights law analysis, Ronen concludes that “even in 
Cyprus, large-scale expulsion does not seem to be legally possible . . . in both the 
Baltic states and Cyprus, international law protects the right of settlers to remain in 
the territory”). 
 195.  Ronen, International Law, supra note 72, at 91 (finding that the 
proportionality test does not prohibit repatriation of Israeli settlers as it does for the 
Turkish settlers of Northern Cyprus). 
 196.  See Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 8(2)(b)(viii) (proscribing “the transfer, 
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Moreover, although good faith is considered a “general principle” of 
international law, binding upon States in the exercise of their rights 
and obligations under international law,197 “there exists no obligation 
on individuals to act in good faith under international law.”198 
Applying a good-faith analysis in considering the plea of settlers 
for non-repatriation does not directly punish individual settlers for 
disregarding an international law norm that does not apply to them. 
Nevertheless, it holds them accountable for such conduct by 
detracting from the protection provided to them under international 
law. This position assumes that the international community may 
legitimately expect individuals to feel bound by norms that do not 
formally apply to them, but which are binding upon their State. This 
expectation is, however, far from self-evident. It blurs the distinction 
between individual and state responsibility and raises fairness 
concerns similar to those underlying a prevalent maxim of criminal 
law: nulla poena sine lege (i.e., no punishment without law).199 
 
directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian 
population into the territory it occupies” as a war crime); Cottier, supra note 6, at 
369 (observing that this international criminal prohibition extends beyond the 
forceful transfer of population and encompasses “indirect” transfers, consisting in 
actions of state officials aimed at facilitating the voluntary settlement of the 
occupant’s nationals within the occupied territory). However, this prohibition 
cannot be construed to impose criminal responsibility upon individual settlers who 
were the object of such indirect transfer. See RONEN, TRANSITION FROM ILLEGAL 
REGIMES, supra note 10, at 207 (“[I]t is unlikely that criminal responsibility rests 
with every individual settler.”); Cottier, supra note 6, at 369 (specifying categories 
of individuals that may incur criminal responsibility under Article 8(2)(b)(viii) of 
the Rome Statute, and making no reference to individual settlers). 
 197.  Steven Reinhold, Good Faith in International Law, 2 UCL J.L. & 
JURISPRUDENCE 40, 40 (2013) (“As a ‘general principle,’ good faith forms part of 
the sources of international law.”). Reinhold further observes that:  
The principle of good faith therefore acts not as a source of rights or obligations, but 
more as a means of guiding the exercise of those rights or obligations. Instead of 
answering what the obligations placed on a State are, or why they create legal effects 
for the State, the principle of good faith . . . can guide a State’s behavior as to how the 
inherent rights and obligations are exercised.  
Id. at 58; see also Michael Virally, Review Essay: Good Faith in Public 
International Law, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 130, 130 (1983). 
 198.  Hélène Lambert, The EU Asylum Qualification Directive, Its Impact on the 
Jurisprudence of the United Kingdom and International Law, 55 INT’L & COMP. 
L.Q. 161, 172 (2006). 
 199.  STEVEN R. RATNER, JASON S. ABRAMS & JAMES L. BISCHOFF, 
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 32 (3d ed. 2000) (observing that this 
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Moreover, concerns of arbitrariness loom large. Individuals’ 
awareness of violations of international norms that do not directly 
apply to them may vary in degree from mere rumors to certainty. 
What is the degree and nature of awareness of violations of 
international law that attains legal significance in the application of 
international human rights law or of State Responsibility Rules? 
Various factors may indicate the degree to which individual 
settlers are aware of the violation of international law arising from 
their settlement in the occupied territory. These factors include: 
extensive public discourse about the settlements in their society, 
which exposes them to claims from the international community 
about the illegality of the settlement activity; the social 
circumstances of the settlers (e.g., their level of education) that affect 
their exposure to opinions about violations of international law; the 
relative moral gravity of the acts that amount to violations of 
international law; and presentations made by the settlers’ government 
regarding the content of international law. The passage of time may 
be another factor that is relevant for assessing the good faith of 
individual settlers. Our moral expectations of the second or third 
generation of settlers may differ from our expectations of the settlers 
who migrated to the occupied territory. Various factors that are key 
to assessing an individual’s bad-faith may point in different 
directions and international law provides no guidance regarding the 
relative weight of each factor. 
As noted by one commentator, “bad faith is never to be presumed 
 
principle’s manifestation includes “constitutional prohibitions on ex post facto 
laws, judicial rules of construction limiting the use of analogy in interpreting 
criminal laws, doctrines prohibiting ambiguous criminal laws, and provisions in 
international human rights instruments barring prosecutions for acts not criminal at 
the time of their commission”); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Post-Conflict Justice in Iraq: 
An Appraisal of the Iraq Special Tribunal, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 327, 373 (2005) 
(“The maxims nulla poene sine lege and nullum crimen sine lege have long been 
regarded as cornerstone principles of criminal law. They have become known in 
almost all of the world’s legal systems as the principles of legality”); Theodor 
Meron, Reflections on the Prosecution of War Crimes by International Tribunals, 
100 AM. J. INT’L L. 551, 576 (2006) (“Ultimately, the nullum crimen principle 
turns on fairness to the defendant.”); Jürgen Schwarze, Judicial Review of 
European Administrative Procedure, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 85, 104-05 
(2004) (arguing that this principle should also govern the imposing of non-criminal 
sanctions). 
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but, rather, always has to be proven.”200 Settlers may be exposed to 
conflicting messages about the legality of settlements under 
international law from their government and others in their country 
and abroad.201 How should the settlers address such conflicting 
claims? Are individual settlers expected to question their 
government’s position about the state of international law? Is it 
sufficient that an individual settler knew of a claim regarding a 
violation of international law? The lack of clear international law 
rules that provide guidance for assessing good faith is likely to cause 
arbitrariness and political manipulation in distinguishing one group 
of settlers from another. 
The position that ties the protection of individuals under State 
Responsibility Rules to the assessment of their good faith has been 
clearly rejected by the ECtHR in Demopoulos. Although the Court 
ascribed considerable weight to the interests of current occupants of 
the applicants’ property, it saw no reason to inquire into their good 
faith in occupying property previously expropriated in violation of 
international law. The Court’s judgment completely disregards the 
question of whether and to what extent current occupants were aware 
of the violations of international law arising from the dispossession 
of the owners of the property and whether Turkish settlers occupying 
Greek-Cypriot property were aware of the violation of international 
law arising from their migration to Northern Cyprus. Proponents of 
good-faith analysis have thus critically observed that “the ECtHR 
took into account the interests of the Turkish settlers . . . . [and] [i]t 
did not tie the legitimacy of these interests with considerations of the 
legality or good faith involved in those settlers’ residence in the 
TRNC.”202 By contrast, the ECtHR did examine the good faith of 
 
 200.  Reinhold, supra note 197, at 50.   
 201.   
The legal debate concerning the Israeli settlements has focused primarily on Article 49 
paragraph 6 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits the occupant from 
transferring parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies. The 
Israeli government has always maintained that the prohibition does not include 
voluntary transfer of citizens to occupied territories because it was informed by, and 
should be interpreted in light of, the policies practiced by Germany during WWII, to 
which the Israeli policy cannot be compared. 
Ben-Naftali, Gross & Michaeli, supra note 3, at 581; see supra notes 2-4 and 
accompanying text (discussing how the international community has rejected this 
position). 
 202.  RONEN, TRANSITION FROM ILLEGAL REGIMES, supra note 10, at 100; see 
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individuals in purchasing previously expropriated property if it was 
alleged that the purchase violated domestic regulations.203 The 
position that links the protection of individuals under State 
Responsibility Rules to good-faith analysis concerning awareness of 
violation of international law also lacks support in the ICJ 
jurisprudence.204 
The reluctance of the ECtHR in Demopoulos to resort to good 
faith analysis seems to undermine the position stated in the ILC 
Commentary, which maintains that the good faith of a third party that 
would be adversely affected by restitution should be considered in 
examining whether the material impossibility exception applies to 
protect that party.205 Alternatively, a combined reading of 
Demopoulos and of the ILC Commentary may suggest that good-
faith analysis has limited weight in determining the applicability of 
the material impossibility exception. According to this 
understanding, although good-faith analysis may be significant in 
determining whether the interests of one or a few third parties 
preclude restitution, such analysis cannot overturn the fundamental 
reluctance of international law to impose on States a positive 
obligation to interfere with the lives of a large number of individuals. 
Demopoulos suggests that good-faith analysis that concerns the 
 
also Loucaides, supra note 60, at 461 (“[I]t is submitted that the Court wrongly . . . 
makes allowances for persons living on the properties of the applicants, granted 
that all those persons who do use the properties in question without the consent of 
the lawful owners are trespassers.”). 
 203.  Pincová v. Czech Republic, 2002-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 311, 323 (underlining 
that the Czech authorities argued that the applicants have purchased the 
expropriated property “at a price lower than the price resulting from application of 
the rules on prices then in force”).  
 204.  The jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice does not directly 
address the question of whether or not the protection of individuals under State 
Responsibility Rules should be linked to good-faith analysis. As noted above, in its 
Namibia Advisory Opinion, the ICJ recognized an exception to the obligation of 
states under State Responsibility Rules not to recognize as lawful a situation 
resulting from a serious breach of a peremptory norm of international law. 
Namibia Advisory Opinion, supra note 165, at 44 (noting that the exception holds 
that such non-recognition is not warranted where it can operate “only to the 
detriment of the inhabitants of the Territory”). See RONEN, TRANSITION FROM 
ILLEGAL REGIMES, supra note 10, at 99 (“[T]he majority opinion in the Namibia 
Advisory Opinion does not mention good faith as a condition for protection under 
the exception”).  
 205.  See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
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awareness of Israeli settlers of the violation of international law 
arising from the settlements enterprise does not preclude the 
application of the material impossibility exception to their plea for 
non-repatriation. 
VI. THE FUTURE OF SETTLEMENTS AND 
NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD ENDING THE 
OCCUPATION 
An exemption from the obligation to repatriate illegally implanted 
settlers granted to an occupant under the material impossibility 
exception does not shield the settlers from repatriation by the 
legitimate sovereign of the occupied territory when the occupation 
ends, if that repatriation is not prohibited under international human 
rights law. However, applicability of the material impossibility 
exception is highly significant in determining whether an occupant 
may legitimately advance the interest of settlers in non-repatriation 
as part of negotiating the end of occupation. 
The applicability of the restitution obligation, which reflects the 
occupant’s duty to repatriate the settlers, a priori precludes 
considering the interest in non-repatriation as a legitimate claim by 
the occupant in negotiating the end of occupation. The argument that 
an occupant may insist, in the course of negotiations, on the 
continued existence of a factual reality that the occupant itself is 
duty-bound to terminate, is hardly tenable. Yet, this article shows 
that the absence of a duty of the occupant to repatriate the settlers 
allows for a strong argument in favor of including the interest in non-
repatriation within the sphere of interests that an occupant may 
legitimately promote in negotiating the end of occupation. 
Any inquiry into the range of interests that an occupant may 
legitimately promote in negotiating the end of occupation is 
inherently confined to occupations resulting from the lawful use of 
force. Occupations emanating from an unlawful use of force by the 
occupant represent a continuing violation of the international 
prohibition against the use of force.206 Because customary 
 
 206.  An amendment to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
adopted by consensus in 2010, provides that one of the acts that qualify as an “act 
of aggression” is “the invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the 
territory of another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting 
  
96 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [30:1 
international law recognizes no exception to the obligation of States 
to cease an internationally wrongful conduct, such occupation must 
be terminated unconditionally. Examining whether Israel may insist 
on the non-repatriation of Israeli settlers in negotiating the end of its 
occupation of Arab territories, this article follows the prevailing view 
that this occupation resulted from Israel’s lawful use of force in self-
defense.207 
Some commentators argue that, in the case of an occupation that 
resulted from the occupant using force in self-defense, whether the 
continued occupation is legal is subject to the necessity and 
proportionality requirements that delineate the contours of the right 
to self-defense.208 According to this view, the interests that the 
occupant may legitimately pursue in maintaining the occupation and 
 
from such invasion or attack.” See Resolution RC/Res.6 of the Review Conference 
of the Rome Statute, Amendments on the Crime of Aggression to the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court, (June 11, 2010).  Similarly, the Declaration on 
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation 
among States, adopted by consensus by the U.N. General Assembly, states that 
“the territory of a State shall not be the object of military occupation resulting from 
the use of force in contravention of the provisions of the Charter.” Declaration on 
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 
2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/25/2625 (Oct. 24, 1970); see also Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 
100 (June 27) (holding that this General Assembly resolution is indicative of 
customary international law). 
 207.  See, e.g., YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE 206-
07 (5th ed. 2012); GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNHARD 
GOETZ AND THE LAW ON TRIAL 20-21 (1990); THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO 
FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS AND ARMED ATTACKS 105-06 (2002); 
GEOFFREY R. WATSON, THE OSLO ACCORDS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE 
ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE AGREEMENTS 30 (2000); Michael P. Scharf, Clear 
and Present Danger: Enforcing the International Ban on Biological and Chemical 
Weapons Through Sanctions, Use of Force, and Criminalization, 20 MICH. J. INT’L 
L. 477, 491-92 (1999):  
The United Nations appeared to recognize the right of anticipatory self-defense when 
Israel launched a preemptory airstrike against Egypt, precipitating the 1967 “Six Day 
War.” Many countries supported Israel’s right to conduct defensive strikes prior to 
armed attack and draft resolutions condemning the Israeli action were soundly 
defeated in the Security Council and the General Assembly. 
But see John Quigley, The Oslo Accords: International Law and the Israeli-
Palestinian Peace Agreements, 25 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 73, 81 (2001) 
(“Israel’s claim of self-defense in the 1967 war is factually implausible.”). 
 208.  ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL 
REAPPRAISAL 55, 99 (1995); BENVENISTI, supra note 3, at 17. 
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negotiating its termination are limited to those security objectives 
that a State may promote in a war of self-defense.209 This view does 
not seem to allow an occupant to present conditions for ending the 
occupation, other than the establishing of security measures that are 
designed to “remove the threat of reasonably foreseeable future 
attacks.”210 It is possible, however, to point to international practice 
that runs counter to this view. 
U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, adopted in the wake of the 
1967 war that resulted in the Israeli occupation of Arab territories, 
tied Israel’s withdrawal from occupied territories to the 
establishment of “a just and lasting peace,” which entails “respect for 
and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
political independence of every State in the area and their right to 
live in peace.”211 This Resolution indicates that Israel may 
legitimately require political measures, such as Arab countries 
formally recognizing Israel’s right to exist, as a condition to ending 
the occupation. 
Moreover, a large segment of the international community seems 
to have accepted the Israeli position that withdrawing from occupied 
territories must be part of a comprehensive political settlement that 
 
 209.  See Cassese, supra note 180, at 55; BENVENISTI, supra note 3, at 17. 
 210.  Michael N. Schmitt, Counter-Terrorism and the Use of Force in 
International Law 20 (George C. Marshall Ctr., Paper No. 5, 2002) (justifying use 
of force in self-defense that is “no more than necessary to defeat the armed attack 
and remove the threat of reasonably foreseeable future attacks.”).  Some 
commentators have argued that the use of force in self-defense must be limited to 
halting and repelling the armed attack that triggered the right to use force, and that 
the aims of war may not extend to the creation of permanent conditions of security. 
See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 355 (2d ed. 2005) (“Self-defence 
must limit itself to rejecting the armed attack; it must not go beyond this 
purpose”.); Enzo Cannizzaro, Contextualizing Proportionality: Jus As Bellum and 
Jus In Bello in the Lebanese War, 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 779, 785 (2006). 
 211.  Providing that the Security Council: 
1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just 
and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the 
following principles: (i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in 
the recent conflict; (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect 
for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political 
independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure 
and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.   
 S.C. Res. 242, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/242 (Nov. 22, 1967). 
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marks the “end of all claims.”212 In the context of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, the “end of all claims” mainly refers to settling 
the controversy between Israel and the Palestinians regarding the 
claim of Palestinian refugees to a right of return to the territory of 
Israel proper.213 International practice thus suggests that in 
negotiating the end of occupation, an occupant may legitimately 
pursue certain interests that extend beyond security measures on the 
ground. 
Yoram Dinstein has suggested that, in negotiating the terms of a 
peace treaty ending the occupation, an occupant may insist on 
vindicating state interests that seem remote from the sphere of 
security considerations, such as the payment of reparations to the 
occupant by the sovereign of the occupied territory.214 The scope of 
interests transcending security considerations, which an occupant 
may legitimately pursue in maintaining the occupation or negotiating 
its termination, remains unclear. Addressing the uncertainty 
concerning the range of legitimate interests that may be pursued by 
an occupant, Gabriella Blum observed that, “the only uniform 
restraint upon present-day occupations seems to be the ban on 
annexation.”215 
 
 212.  Statement by PM Netanyahu on Address by US President Obama, ISR. 
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (May 19, 2011), http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/Press 
Room/2011/Pages/PM_Netanyahu_US_President_Obama_speech_19-May-
2011.aspx [hereinafter Statement by PM Netanyahu]; see, e.g., Press Release, 
European Union, Joint Statement by the EU High Representative Catherine Ashton 
and the Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov on Middle East 
Peace Process (Dec. 21, 2012), available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ 
uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/134545.pdf (“The parties must engage 
in direct and substantial negotiations without preconditions in order to achieve a 
lasting solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, ending all claims”).  
 213.  See Statement by PM Netanyahu, supra note 212; see also Benvenisti & 
Zamir, supra note 177, at 295 (observing that this controversy is perceived to be 
“one of the major stumbling blocks to Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation.”). 
 214.  DINSTEIN, BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION, supra note 23, at 270:  
The treaty of peace may even permit future return of armed forces of the (formerly) 
Occupying Power to at least a portion of what used to be an occupied territory, in 
response to a material breach of its provisions by the restored sovereign. Article 430 of 
the Treaty of Versailles permitted such reoccupation as a countermeasure against 
Germany’s possible failure to observe its obligations in the sphere of reparations. In 
the event, France and Belgium actually reoccupied the Ruhr Valley on that basis in 
1923.  
 215.  Gabriella Blum, The Fog of Victory, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 391, 405 (2013). 
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International practice directly supports the view that an occupant 
may legitimately insist on the non-repatriation of settlers in 
negotiating the end of occupation. Reviewing the various cases of 
illegally implanted settlers, Yael Ronen observes that “in most of the 
cases . . . the settler population was eventually given the opportunity 
to remain in the territory, either unreservedly (as in Zimbabwe and 
South Africa), or with qualifications (in the Baltic States only to 
civilian population, in the TRNC on a numerical basis).”216 
Recognizing the role of political realities and considerations that 
shape these arrangements does not justify dismissing the emerging 
practice in construing customary international law. An analogy to the 
claim of victims of mass deportations to a right of return and to the 
repossession of their property seems instructive. 
Reviewing international practice, Eyal Benvenisti and Eyal Zamir 
observed that “history shows that in no case of massive relocation—
either in accordance with an agreed plan or as a result of the horrors 
of war—have the refugees regained the property they left behind.”217 
Similarly, they demonstrated that international practice runs contrary 
to the claim that the right of return of victims of mass dislocations is 
recognized under international law.218 This practice affects the 
strength of refugees’ claims to repossess the property that they have 
left behind and to a right of return, and was one of the factors that led 
Benvenisti and Zamir to conclude that customary international law 
does not recognize such rights.219 Addressing later events, Eric 
Rosand expressed hope that the return of hundreds of thousands of 
Bosnian refugees would support a construction of international 
treaties that recognizes such a right.220 
It seems that the weight attributed to state practice regarding the 
claims of refugees stems from the recognition that in addition to the 
role of power politics such practice is influenced by “countervailing 
humanitarian considerations”221 that concern the interests of 
individuals who would be adversely affected by the return of 
refugees to the property they have left behind. Similarly, past 
 
 216.  Ronen, Status of Settlers, supra note 188, at 43. 
 217.  Benvenisti & Zamir, supra note 177, at 324.  
 218.  Id. at 324-25. 
 219.  Id. at 325. 
 220.  Rosand, supra note 177, at 1097-98.  
 221.  BENVENISTI, supra note 3, at 308. 
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international practice of non-repatriation of illegally implanted 
settlers, which may also be attributed to both power politics and 
“countervailing humanitarian considerations,” suggests that an 
occupant may legitimately advance the interest of settlers in non-
repatriation in negotiating the end of occupation. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
State Responsibility Rules provide illegally implanted settlers with 
protection that is weaker but broader than that they enjoy under 
international human rights law. International human rights law may 
prohibit the repatriation of certain settlers. Such protection is not 
available under State Responsibility Rules. Yet, the interests of 
individual settlers may support an occupant being exempt from its 
obligation to dismantle illegally established settlements even if 
international human rights law allows this measure. Such exemption 
neither depends on the contours of human rights contained in 
international human rights treaties of which the occupant is a 
signatory, nor does it have to be justified under a strict balancing-of-
interest analysis. Rather, State Responsibility Rules exempt an 
occupant from eliminating the consequences of its illegal conduct 
whenever such measure would entail the forceful eviction of a large 
number of individuals from their homes. Israel is therefore allowed, 
but is not required, to repatriate the settlers it has transferred into the 
Arab territories it occupies. The absence of a duty to repatriate the 
settlers allows for a strong argument in favor of including non-
repatriation within the sphere of interests that Israel may legitimately 
promote in negotiating the end of occupation. 
 
